The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich published its Space Cyber Threat Intelligence: Threat Landscape Report 2025 on 30 September 2026, covering 407 operations against 183 space organizations. Its author, Clémence Poirier, summed it up this way: there was more than one cyberattack a day against the sector during that year.
The pattern the paper draws is recognizable to anyone who follows industrial cybersecurity. DDoS was the most frequent malicious activity, while ransomware and data theft gained weight. Behind the 407 incidents are 139 different threat actors, and most are hacktivist groups that choose targets based on how the war in Ukraine, tensions between India and Pakistan, the conflict with Iran or the one in Gaza are going.
Therein lies the paradox, and also the reason to read the report calmly. The satellite, that expensive object everyone imagines as a priority target, did not receive a single documented hit. What was attacked was the ground infrastructure that controls it. And that absence says less about the security of satellites than about our inability to see what happens inside them.
What is the ground segment, in one sentence?
The ground segment is everything on Earth that makes a satellite work: stations that send commands and collect telemetry, control centers, networks that carry the data and the end customer's modem. Without that half, the satellite is a very expensive box spinning in the void.
The attack frontier, therefore, is not 500 kilometers up, but in the cable and the router that connect the mission to the internet. Digitalization and commercial off-the-shelf components have made the sector cheaper and have multiplied the doors, because every manufacturer, every launcher and every cloud provider adds a surface that no one monitors.
An attacker does not need to touch space to leave a constellation silent. All they need is to get into the system that manages it and use it as if they were the network's legitimate operator.
407 reported incidents
The report does not provide percentages in its public summary, but the breakdown can be reconstructed from its own data. DDoS accounts for the largest share, with 247 cases and 61% of the total, and ransomware accounts for 13%.
| Dominant activity |
Cases |
Weight |
What the attacker is after |
| DDoS |
247 |
61 % |
Take the service down and make it visible |
| Ransomware |
no public figure |
13 % |
Collect, and leak what is not paid |
| Data leak |
no public figure |
5 % |
Expose information and apply pressure |
It is worth qualifying that these labels describe techniques, not motivations. A DDoS by a hacktivist collective and another signed by a criminal gang look alike in execution and differ in purpose, and the report counts them together because it observes operations.
There is also a methodological trap worth keeping in mind when reading the table. A DDoS is detected the same day and leaves a trace on any traffic dashboard, whereas a silent intrusion into a workstation can take months to surface. The space sector resembles the Linux kernel in something hardly flattering: it receives more incidents than it can classify, as we reported in the avalanche of CVEs and AI-assisted triage.
The night the ground stopped responding
The best example is still the attack on the KA-SAT network on 24 February 2022, more than four years ago and a few hours before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The intruder exploited a misconfigured VPN, entered the management segment and issued legitimate commands to wipe the flash memory of thousands of modems.
The satellite itself was not touched. The modems were, and with them the connection went down for thousands of Ukrainian customers and tens of thousands more across the rest of Europe. The program was called AcidRain and it dragged along an effect almost no one remembers: the 5,800 Enercon wind turbines that lost their telemetry in Germany.
That is the damage the space cyberattack label hides. There is no explosion or orbital debris; there are silent services, operators who discover their dependency the same day they lose it, and a failure that looks like a bad afternoon of technical support.
The logic is no different from the one that left 115 European supermarkets with refrigeration out of control due to remote access, as we reported in the attack that shut down the freezers of 115 stores, except that here the remote control moves something that orbits.
Hacktivists with the battle report open
The 139 identified actors are not evenly distributed. Most are hacktivist groups, a category that carries more weight in this space because the target is not always the mission, but the country to which the organization operating it belongs. The report links the peaks to Ukraine, to Indo-Pakistani tensions, to Iran and to Gaza.
In November 2025, CSS published the work Breaking the Final Frontier, covering 237 operations between January 2023 and July 2025, with a peak of 72 in June 2025. That figure has been reported as if it were 237 attacks from the Gaza war, when it is 237 operations over two and a half years.
The reading that remains is uncomfortable for the industry. A space organization can be attacked not for what it does, but for the passport of its parent company or for the client it serves, and that makes it part of the battlefield even if no missile ever reaches orbit.
The good side of a record with no satellites
Read positively, the data has value. None of the 407 operations destroyed a craft in orbit, nor diverted it, nor shut it down permanently. Everything that broke was on the ground, where it can be patched, a credential replaced and the service brought back up.
That nuance matters because the scenario that sells the most fear, that of the hijacked or deliberately crashed satellite, requires capabilities different from those appearing in the report. The 2025 incidents were mostly service interruptions and leaks with a corporate victim, not orbital weapons. The distance between the narrative and the record is the distance between cinema and a cloud bill.
The blind spot that the figure cannot cover
The bad news is the same sentence read backwards. Most operational satellites do not carry onboard sensors capable of detecting malicious activity, so an attack against a device may leave no telemetry to analyze. A silent intruder would be invisible by definition, not improbable.
Poirier admits this bluntly in the report itself and in a later article of October 12, 2026. The 407 incidents are a floor and not a ceiling, because the sector has incompatible definitions of its perimeter, fragmented sources, little willingness to report incidents and tools designed for corporate networks that fit poorly with a device that spends half an orbit out of coverage.
From darkness to transparency
The CSS recommendations do not call for an impossible technological leap. They call for onboard detection, common reporting formats, adapted intelligence frameworks and sharing communities with clear rules, because the old security-through-obscurity model no longer holds anything up. Commercialization, catalog components and accessible technical information have torn down that wall.
ETH Zurich itself published the report Hacking the Cosmos in 2024, and its work on Ukraine and Gaza already showed that space is no longer an exotic target. What has changed now is the scale. These are no longer state operations against a specific satellite, but a daily drip against organizations that do not see themselves as critical infrastructure.
The next incident probably will not make the front page either
If this tally teaches anything, it is that the headline of the future will not be a hijacked satellite, but a ground station compromised for weeks and a service that degrades without anyone knowing why. The surveillance that matters is not in orbit; it is in supplier contracts and in the telemetry that almost no one collects.
The figure worth tracking is not the 407 incidents, but how many are disclosed and how many operators deploy on-board detection in the coming years. As long as that response remains pending, any data from the sector will be a photograph of the ground with the sky out of focus.