The Financial Stability Board (FSB) published on 11 November 2026 its second peer review of Turkey, and the diagnosis leaves one concrete gap: the country has brought order to its cryptoasset market, but still has no rules for those who issue stablecoins. The FSB peer review puts 2025 annual transactions at almost USD 200 billion, the highest figure in the Middle East and North Africa.
It is worth clarifying what the FSB is. It is a forum that coordinates financial stability officials from 24 jurisdictions, not a regulator with sanctioning powers: its recommendations are not legally binding and their force is reputational. Turkey volunteered for this review in 2026 and the Wednesday's statement sums up the diagnosis in four recommendations.
The delicate point appears when that forum touches the part of the market that an economy with a weak lira uses every day. Turks hold stablecoins as a refuge from inflation and depreciation, and the review acknowledges that, without issuance requirements, this habit feeds a digital dollarization that is later costly to reverse. The current limits of USD 3,000 a day and USD 50,000 a month curb capital flight, but they do not bring order to issuance.
What Turkey already has and what it lacks
The review acknowledges progress that is not cosmetic. Since 2025, the Capital Markets Board has required cryptoasset service providers to register and hold a licence, obliges them to segregate client assets from company assets under strict criteria and keeps the ban on using cryptoassets for domestic payments, measures that cut channels of contagion to banks and payment systems.
The framework works for supervising intermediaries and leaves out the link that sets the value. The FSB says so bluntly: stablecoins are not subject to full regulation, supervision and oversight, and there is no regime for issuers, only anti-money laundering controls and the oversight each platform exercises over listing and custody.
Supervision has also only just begun. The report describes selective on-site inspections backed by external audits and the first enforcement actions, a detail that qualifies the idea of a regulator with a long track record.
The centralized data platform does exist and adds monitoring capacity. It is called KVMKS, reconciles what the platforms report and, using official data, puts holdings at around USD 3 billion in 2026, close to 0.3% of banking sector assets.
A market of 7.1 million accounts with a single local issuer
The size of the phenomenon helps explain the urgency. The authorities report more than 7.1 million cryptoasset accounts corresponding to 5.3 million entities, although only 51% have a positive balance in their wallets, and the holdings declared by local platforms are spread across 1,500 different types of assets. In that inventory, the only stablecoin issued by a Turkish entity is BiLira (TRYB), with a market capitalization of around USD 5.9 million and a liquidity that depreciation has been draining.
The rest of the market runs on other countries' dollars. 2025 blockchain data show that dollar-pegged stablecoins account for 17% of transactions versus 3% for other stablecoins and tokenized assets, a split that explains why the FSB looks at the distribution of foreign instruments and not only at local issuance.
Transfer limits complete the supervisory picture. The full review report sets USD 3,000 a day and USD 50,000 a month for crypto-to-crypto transfers, with temporary exceptions for corporate clients that must be approved by each platform's board of directors after enhanced due diligence.
Why does unregulated issuance weigh more heavily here?
The review insists on a difference of context that is not rhetorical. In an emerging economy with high retail use, exchange-rate-linked channels and the potential for digital dollarization, the absence of a regime for issuers stops being a technical gap and becomes a central financial stability concern. The FSB writes that sentence in the conclusions chapter, and Turkey's central bank and banking regulator share the diagnosis on cross-border flows and the composition of deposits.
The BIS already warned about this new dollarization via stablecoins in July 2026. The G20 agenda on cross-border stablecoins also called for better data on a market increasingly intertwined with banking. Turkey appears in both debates for the same reason.
The review adds a nuance worth keeping. The Turkish authorities themselves consider that transmission channels are contained by the size of the crypto ecosystem and its limited interconnection with the traditional financial system, so the risk exists but is not systemic today, and that difference matters when calibrating any new rule.
What does the FSB ask of issuers?
The fourth recommendation is the one that will give Ankara the most work. The FSB calls for issuance requirements tailored to fiat-referenced stablecoins, with redemption rights, effective stabilization mechanisms and prudential requirements for the issuer, as well as clarifying how the stablecoin coexists with payments and e-money rules without opening the door to its use in domestic payments.
| Requirement |
What the review asks for |
Where Turkey stands |
| Redemption rights |
Clear and timely redemption, with conditions known in advance |
No specific rules; the provider framework does not cover it |
| Stabilization |
Reserves and mechanisms that sustain the stated peg |
No composition requirements or reserve transparency |
| Prudential requirements |
Capital and risk management requirements for the issuer |
No issuance regime, only general market rules |
| Payments and electronic money |
Clarify how it fits with current regulations |
Amendment to central bank regulations pending |
| Foreign issuers |
Conditions for stablecoins from abroad distributed in the country |
No listing requirements or parity track record |
The table reveals the underlying problem. Turkey can monitor who distributes and who provides custody, and in fact it does, but it lacks the instruments to assess the parity, the quality of reserves or the track record of a foreign stablecoin that reaches its users through local platforms.
The electronic money door that remains open
There is a detail that the review highlights and that often goes unnoticed. A recent amendment allows certain stablecoins referenced to a currency to be treated as equivalent to electronic money, and since the ban on paying with cryptoassets does not extend to electronic money, a channel opens for using them in payments until the central bank publishes its implementing regulations.
That margin keeps uncertainty in the most sensitive place. The FSB acknowledges that the lack of listing rules on stabilization mechanisms, reserve transparency and parity track record leaves platforms assessing risks they cannot verify, while unregulated crypto gateway providers seek online merchants.
The Turkish banking sector is in no hurry either. The report notes that several banks have raised objections to opening accounts for stablecoin businesses on compliance and competition grounds, a resistance that delays integration with the regulated financial system.
The perimeter grows and the issuer is left outside
Turkey has chosen a path consistent with its monetary policy: registering and licensing intermediaries, banning domestic payments and monitoring activity from a central registry. That perimeter has merit and the review itself acknowledges it, but it leaves out the piece that determines how many synthetic dollars circulate within the system and at what price they are redeemed when the holder wants to exit. Without that piece, the rest of the supervisory building depends on the good faith of issuers operating outside the country.
The next move depends on Ankara, not the FSB. An issuer regime with reserve and redemption rules, together with a clear decision on the electronic money channel, would close the gap the report points to. Until that arrives, Turkish supervision will know who sells the stablecoin and will still not know who is accountable for it. The 10% tax proposal on crypto gains that Turkey discussed in March 2026 points in another direction: taxing retail use before ordering issuance.