That semantic shift is one of the most interesting elements for understanding platforms such as Polymarket and Kalshi. Their users can place money on who will win an election, which team will win a match, what a president will say, whether a drug will be approved, what the temperature will be tomorrow or how many flights will be cancelled. They do not buy a stake in a company, they do not finance a factory, they do not acquire government debt and they do not buy a raw material that can be used to produce something else. They buy a position on an event. If it happens, they win. If it does not happen, they lose.
The technological innovation may be considerable. The anthropological innovation is considerably less so. Humanity has been betting on uncertain events for thousands of years. What is genuinely new is the extraordinary expansion of the territory that can become a bet. The whole of reality is beginning to turn into a market.
Spain offers a good example of the battle being fought around these new products. In May 2026, the Directorate-General for the Regulation of Gambling opened sanction proceedings against Polymarket and Kalshi and ordered the precautionary blocking of their websites in Spanish territory for operating without the authorization required by Spanish gambling law. The issue is important because the Spanish administration has not accepted that placing the word market in front of a bet automatically places it outside the rules governing gambling.
The very way the Spanish authorities describe these platforms is especially significant: prediction platforms on which bets are placed. Therein lies much of the conflict. The discussion is not only about deciding whether Polymarket or Kalshi meet certain administrative requirements. This is a much deeper battle over the social definition of an activity.
If these products are financial markets, they should be viewed primarily through the lens of financial regulation. If they are technologically sophisticated bookmakers, they fall within the territory of gambling laws. And behind that apparently bureaucratic difference lies an enormous difference in advertising, consumer protection, access for minors, prevention of problem behaviour, taxation and operator liability.
France has followed a similar line. The French gambling regulator has considered that services such as Polymarket fall within unauthorized gambling activities and has ordered access to the platform to be blocked. Other countries have adopted different restrictions. There is no single international regulatory answer, but a single question is beginning to emerge: what exactly are these markets that allow money to be bet on practically any event?
The question matters because language is never a secondary element of technological transformations. New industries tend to change the words we use to describe known activities. Uber did not talk about taxis, but about drivers. Airbnb did not talk about hotels, but about hosts. Social networks did not define themselves as gigantic advertising companies fed by behavioural profiles, but as platforms for connecting people. Cryptocurrencies were not initially presented as a new financial industry either, but as decentralized protocols.
Words are part of the infrastructure of innovation. They determine how we interpret what is in front of us and, often, which legislation we consider applicable. Prediction markets use the vocabulary of finance because that vocabulary generates a certain legitimacy. People bet, but they talk about trading. People bet, but they talk about trading. Bettors come to be called traders and bets are presented as contracts on whether an event will happen or not. Odds become prices that supposedly express probabilities. And the bookmaker acquires a much more respectable name: market.
Financializing events
That does not mean these markets lack intellectual interest. On the contrary. Prediction markets start from a powerful idea, which is to use economic incentives to aggregate information dispersed among thousands or millions of people. If many people hold different fragments of information and are willing to risk money on their convictions, the resulting price can function as a kind of collective intelligence about the future.
In theory, those with better information have more incentive to participate. Those who misread reality lose money. The market gradually aggregates opinions, expectations and knowledge until it generates a certain estimate of the probability that an event will occur. That capacity explains part of the fascination these platforms arouse and also part of their potential usefulness.
The problem begins when we move from predicting events to financializing events. Because then the market stops being exclusively an observer of reality and starts to become part of it.
FlightAware's lawsuit against Kalshi
The lawsuit filed by the company FlightAware against Kalshi, as reported by The Block, allows us to see with extraordinary clarity where that boundary appears. Kalshi offered markets linked to flight cancellations. Users could place money on the percentage of flights that would be cancelled at certain airports. Resolving those bets required a reliable source of information certifying which flights had actually been cancelled.
Kalshi chose FlightAware. According to the lawsuit, the platform identified FlightAware to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission as the Primary Source Agency, that is, as the main source used to resolve those contracts. FlightAware maintains that this use was made without its knowledge or consent. Kalshi's pages included references indicating that the outcome would be verified through FlightAware and that a flight would count as cancelled when it was classified as such by the flight-tracking company.
We are talking about real flights, real airports, real airlines and real passengers. And a question inevitably arises: what happens when someone can make more money by altering an event than by predicting it?.
Who can make it happen
Let us think about a presidential election. The vast majority of citizens can only bet on who will win. They cannot directly decide the outcome. But some people possess privileged information or certain capacities for influence. Now let us transfer that same logic to much smaller events: the temperature recorded by a weather station, the streams of a song, the words a president will say, the cancellation of a flight or the result of a clinical trial.
Then the relationship between market and event changes completely. We no longer ask only who knows best what will happen. We have to start asking who can make it happen.
FlightAware's lawsuit includes a particularly revealing case related to Polymarket. In April 2026, the platform allowed betting on the daily maximum temperature in Paris using as a reference a weather station located at Charles de Gaulle airport. An anonymous trader placed improbable bets against the outcome that practically the entire market expected. Shortly afterwards, that station recorded a brief rise in temperature that did not appear at nearby stations. The trader turned less than 120 dollars into more than 21,000. Météo-France opened an investigation and the matter ended up in the hands of the French police.
That episode does not in itself prove that someone manipulated the weather station. What is truly interesting is that the economic incentive already existed. We had managed to put a price on the possibility of altering a thermometer.
And it is not even necessary to modify an event to profit from these markets. It is enough to know something before everyone else. The same lawsuit includes the case of a White House teleprompter operator who allegedly used his advance knowledge of Donald Trump's speeches to make approximately 100,000 dollars by betting on the words the president would say.
The example reveals another profound transformation. In traditional financial markets we fully understand the concept of insider information. We know that certain people may possess relevant information before the rest of the market and that using it to trade may be prohibited. But if we turn practically any human event into a tradable asset, we also multiply the universe of people who can potentially become insiders.
Health-related events
A doctor may know the result of a clinical trial before anyone else. An airline employee may have advance information about cancellations. A technician may know about a breakdown. A television producer may know who wins a contest. A civil servant may know about an administrative decision. A meteorologist may have certain information before the public. A teleprompter operator may know the words a president will say. Suddenly, small fragments of everyday information acquire financial value.
The boundary becomes even more disturbing when markets reach health-related events. Kalshi has offered markets linked to Food and Drug Administration decisions on certain drugs and the industry has explored bets related to clinical trials. Doctors, researchers and patients have warned of the risks of turning those processes into objects of betting, especially because of the possibility of trading using confidential information.
Here a paradox appears. The more socially important an event is, the more economically attractive it may be to turn it into a market. But the greater the consequences of doing so may also be.
The logic extends even to disasters. In the United States a fierce controversy has arisen around markets linked to wildfires. The problem is not that the vast majority of those participating in those markets will start a fire. Obviously, they will not. The sociological question is different: the system has created an economic reward associated with a certain outcome where none existed before.
Everyday life
Social systems cannot be evaluated solely by thinking about what the majority of reasonable people will do. They must also be evaluated by observing what opportunities they create for extreme behaviour. When a certain event produces an economic reward, an incentive inevitably appears. It may be small, improbable or marginal. But it exists.
For centuries we have been expanding what can become a commodity. Then we expanded what could become a financial asset. Now we are expanding what can become a tradable bet. The result is a kind of financialization of everyday uncertainty.
An election can become a market. A war can become a market. A song can become a market. A phrase uttered by a politician can become a market. A temperature can become a market. A medicine can become a market. A flight can become a market. A fire can become a market.
Defenders of these systems have a reasonable argument: prediction markets produce information. And that is probably true. Their prices can condense collective expectations in an extraordinarily efficient way. But a bookmaker also incorporates statistics, probabilities, mathematical models and knowledge about the participants. The fact that a bet produces information does not mean it stops being a bet.
Perhaps that is one of the most interesting conceptual confusions in this whole debate. An activity can simultaneously be a mechanism for producing information and a gambling system. The two categories are not incompatible.
There is also an even deeper problem. The social sciences have long known about the phenomenon of self-fulfilling prophecies. A prediction can change people's behaviour and end up helping to produce what it initially only sought to anticipate. Prediction markets introduce an economic variant of that phenomenon.
These markets do not limit themselves to saying something about the future. They distribute money depending on what that future is like. And that difference is fundamental. The observer stops being completely outside the event. They have economic interests inside it. The larger the market volume, the greater that incentive may be.
The thermometer stops being only a thermometer. The flight stops being only a flight. The poll stops being only a poll. All of them can become mechanisms for settling contracts and distributing money between winners and losers.
It is not a minor matter. Whoever manages to impose the name will have a strong chance of imposing the regulatory framework as well. If you get something to be perceived socially as a financial market, the rules will be one set. If it is perceived as a bookmaker, they will be another.
Perhaps prediction markets are a logical consequence of our time. We live surrounded by data. Everything can be measured. Everything can become a probability. And what can be expressed as a probability can easily be transformed into a price. Then comes the contract. The process seems almost automatic: data, probability, price, contract, bet.
What kind of society appears
For years we have heard that data was the new oil. Perhaps we are now entering a different phase. Data no longer serves only to describe the world. It also serves to bet on it.
And there the fundamental paradox of prediction markets appears. The better they are at anticipating the future, the more money they will attract. The more money they attract, the greater the incentives to obtain information before everyone else. And the greater those incentives, the greater the temptation to stop limiting oneself to predicting the future and try to intervene in it.
That is why the relevant question may not be whether Polymarket or Kalshi are markets or bookmakers. They probably contain elements of both. The more important question is what kind of society appears when any event, from an election to an illness, from a war to the cancellation of the plane we have to catch tomorrow, can turn into an opportunity for someone to make money from its outcome