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The ECB exposes the cracks in DAO decentralization

The ECB questions DAOs: decentralization is limited and power is concentrated in a few actors within the DeFi ecosystem

DAOs under the microscope, the end of fake decentralization
DAOs under the microscope, the end of fake decentralization

The so-called Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) have been promoted for years as the vanguard of autonomous and decentralized governance. However, these organizations are increasingly facing relevant questions, as the narrative of systems governed exclusively by code is being nuanced by research such as that of the European Central Bank (ECB) itself, which reveals a concentration of power that, in certain respects, brings them closer to traditional corporate structures, albeit without their clear mechanisms of legal liability.

DAO: What are these organizations?

To understand what a DAO is, imagine that a group of people decides to create a club or a company, but instead of trusting a boss, a president or a notary to enforce the rules, they trust the computer code written in a smart contract. In this way, the DAO seeks to achieve three main characteristics:

  • No bosses (decentralized). There is no chief executive or board of directors making decisions unilaterally. Power is distributed among all the people who hold a token (a kind of digital chip or share in that organization).
  • It runs itself (autonomous). The group's rules are written in a smart contract, which is a computer program that executes automatically. For example, if 60% vote yes to spending funds on X project, the money is sent automatically.
  • Total transparency. Because it lives on a blockchain, anyone can see where the money is spent, who voted for what and what the exact rules are.

But are these three points fully met in current DAOs? The empirical evidence suggests not always, according to the ECB.

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The mirage of autonomy

And this is not something that affects only one DAO or a small group of them. In March 2026,  spaces such as DeepDAO indicate that there are some 12,000 of these organizations, some even of Spanish origin, such as Aragon.

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In any case, these organizations manage a significant volume of total value locked (TVL) within the crypto ecosystem. However, growth in volume does not necessarily imply effective decentralization or the absence of risks. In fact, the rapid development of these structures has been accompanied by a growing debate about how they fit within existing regulatory frameworks.

But why does this happen in organizations that are supposed to be decentralized? One of the keys lies in the distribution of governance tokens. Various analyses, including the ECB's, show that, although the tokens are distributed among thousands of addresses, a small proportion of actors concentrate a very significant share of voting power. For example, the ECB documents that the top 100 holders can control more than 80% of the supply in several protocols analyzed.

This asymmetry turns decentralization into a concept that, in practice, can be partial or incomplete, which has given rise to terms such as "DINO" (Decentralized In Name Only), that is, decentralization more nominal than effective.

In this context, many DAOs display dynamics that recall, to some extent, shareholder meetings, where large participants (whales) have a disproportionate influence. Added to this is the fact that, due to the pseudonymous nature of blockchain addresses, in many cases it is not possible to clearly identify who is behind the decisions.

Protocols under scrutiny

Empirical analysis has already put the focus on specific protocols such as Aave, MakerDAO and Uniswap. The ECB itself studies these cases and concludes that a relevant share of governance tokens may be in the hands of entities linked to the protocols themselves or to exchange platforms (exchanges), which can reinforce the concentration of power.

In addition, the report highlights that a large part of voting activity comes from delegates, that is, actors to whom other users have ceded their decision-making power. This mechanism, although it can improve participation, can also amplify the influence of certain participants and make the traceability of real power even more difficult.

In some cases, such as MakerDAO and its recent evolution, or in systems such as Uniswap, the use of delegation has contributed to the emergence of recurring actors in governance, who concentrate a significant share of decision-making capacity. However, the ECB avoids making categorical judgments about individual protocols and focuses on general patterns in the ecosystem.

The regulatory offensive

Faced with this situation, the regulatory debate in Europe is evolving. The ECB does not propose immediate concrete measures, but it does introduce a key concept: the need to identify possible regulatory anchor points. This implies that, to the extent that a structure is not fully decentralized, there could be relevant actors on whom to apply regulatory obligations. Among the possible candidates discussed in academic and regulatory circles are:

Core developers, especially if they retain control over the code or administrative keys. Large token holders if their influence on governance is decisive. Intermediaries or interfaces, such as platforms that facilitate user access to the protocols.

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However, the ECB itself stresses that, with current public information, it is not always possible to clearly identify these actors or assign responsibilities unequivocally.

The future of programmable governance

Against this backdrop, the question is not so much whether DAOs will disappear, but how they will evolve. The evidence suggests that decentralization is not an absolute state but a spectrum, and that many of the current structures sit in intermediate positions.

The sector is likely to evolve in several directions. On the one hand, some organizations could adapt to existing legal frameworks, adopting hybrid structures that combine elements of decentralization with greater legal clarity. On the other, new generations of DAOs could emerge that seek to strengthen mechanisms of real decentralization and transparency.

The so-called founder paradox, the fact that many projects are born with initially centralized structures, remains one of the main challenges. In practice, many governance tokens have functioned similarly to shares in a company, albeit without the associated legal rights.

In short, rather than the end of DAOs, what appears to be taking place is a phase of maturation. The challenge now is to align the technological promise of decentralization with governance structures that are effectively transparent, accountable and sustainable in the long term.

José Maldonado

Author

José Maldonado

Activist and blogger on technology, free software and blockchain.

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