There is an order that no bank disputes. When it arrives on ministry letterhead and asks for customer data, procedure dictates that it be handed over. Revolut obeyed that order for five months and in doing so handed over passports and statements along with verification selfies of some 680 customers to scammers, as the Financial Times revealed on September 15 and the company itself confirmed on the 12th with a notification to those affected.
The blow affects 25 customers in Spain, and targets above all high-net-worth cryptocurrency users, the so-called whales who hold balances capable of justifying a ransom. The attackers are now demanding 3 million dollars and threatening to sell the information, as they described in SecurityWeek based on the messages of the actor who signs as IAmNotAVillain. N26 and Trade Republic did not suffer that same intrusion, but in 2026 they withstood waves of impersonation against their customers using similar techniques and causing real damage.
The question September 2026 leaves behind is; whether the neobank model can withstand the pressure of targeted fraud. Revolut has more than 80 million customers in more than 30 countries and is preparing its national bank in the United States for 2027, while N26 and Trade Republic concentrate millions of young accounts in Europe. When the attack imitates a state and the customer operates only from a mobile phone, the margin for error narrows and each institution's response marks the difference between a scare and an emptied account.
What Revolut handed over over five months
Revolut confirmed on September 12 that an unauthorized third party used the legitimate domain of a government agency to send fraudulent requests for information. The company blocked the address when it discovered the deception and notified the affected agency and the police, as well as informing regulators, though it declined to specify how many customers suffered the leak and which body was impersonated. Its own notification to those affected is, by contrast, very explicit, as it cites identity documents with verification selfies. It also adds addresses and contact phone numbers along with statements and transaction histories.
The problem is that the exposure window was very long. The Duel research team, cited by Hudson Rock and reported by SecurityWeek, reconstructed some five months of responses from Revolut Bank UAB, the group's Lithuanian subsidiary, to messages sent from an account on the pec.interno.it domain of the Italian Interior Ministry. That account belonged to an employee whose access had previously fallen into the hands of criminals through a credential-stealing program, and the attackers used it to submit requests that looked like routine police requirements, which the subsidiary handled without questioning their legitimacy.
It is worth clarifying that the figure of 680 affected comes from what the attacker himself told investigators, not from an official Revolut statement with a closed count. The Spanish press speaks of almost 700 globally and 25 in Spain, while the company limits itself to saying that the group impacted was small and that it has already contacted each person directly. That range between 680 and almost 700 reflects different sources on the same substance, and 680 is used here because it is the figure SecurityWeek links in detail to the intruder's account and to the type of accounts attacked.
Why does fraud with an official stamp work?
The haul is more worrying for its quality than its volume, since 680 people out of 80 million customers represent a tiny fraction but one chosen with intent. Researcher ZachXBT warned from the first weekend that the target appeared to be high-net-worth cryptocurrency users. With a passport, selfie, address and statement in the same folder, a criminal can impersonate the victim before another bank or prepare a months-long social engineering fraud with genuine data.
Banks are obliged to respond to requests from judges and police, and that legal duty creates a fast lane that criminals love. A request that arrives from an official domain tends to be processed with less friction than any other email, especially if the team reviewing those requests is short-staffed. Here the bank itself was the one deceived, not the customer, a twist that renders the classic awareness manuals useless. The attacker operated from inside a compromised account, so header and certificate checks returned a clean result that invited obedience without suspicion.
The key lies in separating authentication of the channel from the legitimacy of the request. That an email genuinely comes from pec.interno.it proves who sent it, but it does not prove that the official wanted to send it or that a judge authorized each handover. A sound control would have required a call back to a known number at the agency, a second confirmation channel for sensitive batches or enhanced review when the request asks for full identity documents along with statements. None of that appears to have happened systematically during the five months the leak lasted, and that absence of brakes explains the scale of the case.
N26 and the trap of the fake support call
N26 did not suffer a comparable central intrusion in September 2026, and it is worth making that clear before continuing so as not to conflate different cases. What it did suffer in July was an aggressive campaign of voice scams and trojan apps against its users in Germany, documented by CyberPress and by banking sector analysts. The script began with a call from a supposed N26 agent who warned of unusual activity and asked the customer to install a help tool, which was in fact the Copybara trojan capable of taking control of the Android phone and operating the banking apps.
The deception worked because it imitated the bank's own security protocol instead of breaking it by force. The victim received instructions dictated calmly, with their name and some of their data already in the scammer's mouth, and each step seemed a reasonable verification until the attacker saw the screen and moved money. The technical reports also describe phishing panels dedicated to N26 that allow personalized notifications to be pushed to the victim's phone, so that the fake alert and the fake call reinforce each other. The bank did not hand over data from its systems; the door was opened from each victim's phone.
Trade Republic and the spoofing that empties accounts
Trade Republic carries into 2026 a persistent problem of impersonation by SMS and calls that spoofs its real number and steals access codes. The German organization Stiftung Warentest warned in May about messages that appear to be sent by the broker, warn of suspicious logins and invite the recipient to call a number controlled by criminals. The German police had already warned in January of a wave with six-figure losses, and Austrian consumer protection portals recorded parallel SMS campaigns in March that directed people to twin websites to harvest credentials.
The case reported in April by Darkgate Magazine shows how far the damage goes when the staging works. A victim lost 100,000 euros after a sequence of calls, messages and screens that reproduced every gesture of genuine security, including the professional calm of the supposed employee and the measured urgency of the supposed incident.
The account details how each code the victim dictated to protect themselves actually served to authorize the next transfer, and how the discovery came late because everything had seemed a legitimate containment procedure. Because the victim reviews their portfolio every few weeks, the delay gave the criminals the window they needed to extract the funds.
Uinku, the Spanish company that will test digital euro payments alongside Revolut and Stripe
Three models against the same enemy
The following table summarizes what was verified as of September 21, 2026 on each case, with the type of attack, the proven vector and the known scope. The difference between a breach in one's own systems and fraud against customers is decisive for apportioning responsibility and for knowing what remedy can be demanded of each institution. The Revolut figures come from the financial press and intelligence firms after speaking with the attacker, while those for N26 and Trade Republic describe campaigns against users documented by technical media and consumer bodies.
| Institution |
Type of verified incident |
Main vector |
Known scope |
| Revolut |
Handover of data to third parties after fake requests |
Official Italian account compromised with stealer program |
About 680 customers, 25 in Spain, over five months |
| N26 |
Voice scams and trojans against customers |
Fake support calls and Copybara trojan |
July 2026 campaign with no public victim count |
| Trade Republic |
Impersonation by SMS and calls against customers |
Spoofed number and twin websites to steal codes |
Six-figure losses according to police, 100,000-euro case |
Read together, the cases show that money moves toward wherever verification depends on a single signal. Revolut trusted the sender domain, N26's victims trusted the voice that knew their data and Trade Republic's trusted the number that appeared on screen. In each of these episodes the attacker controlled precisely the signal the victim used to decide whether something was authentic. Requiring a second confirmation through an independent channel would have broken the chain in all three scenarios.
Where does the banking that lives on our phone fail?
Neobanks compete with a promise of zero friction, with sign-ups in minutes and instant transfers managed from chat. That speed is their commercial advantage and at the same time their Achilles' heel when fraud bears down, because every additional control erodes the experience that sets them apart from traditional banking. The balance between convenience and security breaks sooner in an app than in a branch, where an employee can look the customer in the eye and ask for a second document without anyone considering it an anomaly.
It is worth remembering how verification of requests works at an institution with 80 million customers and dozens of subsidiaries. Each official request must be checked against records and limited to the minimum necessary, as well as documented for the regulator, meticulous work that scales poorly when the team does not grow at the pace of the business. If Revolut's Lithuanian subsidiary processed Italian requests with lax criteria for months, the natural question is how many people were reviewing those files and with what incentives to say no to a supposed ministry.
The difference between the three cases also marks where the regulatory focus in Europe should be placed. At N26 and Trade Republic the regulator can demand better early warning systems with dynamic limits on unusual transactions and swift refunds when the customer was manipulated. At Revolut the examination points to internal data governance, with records of who authorized each handover and audits of third-party access with an official appearance. Brussels is already tightening anti-fraud rules for payments, and this autumn offers it a perfect example of why due diligence cannot be outsourced to a sender.
Vitalik rejects pessimism and sees AI as an ally of cybersecurity
The time to demand answers
The autumn of 2026 leaves an uncomfortable lesson for anyone who entrusts their savings to an app. None of the three institutions suffered a raid by digital hoodlums on its central servers, and yet all three episodes moved real data or money using techniques within the reach of organized gangs. A neobank's security is no longer measured only by its firewalls, but by how its staff respond to an email bearing an official crest and by how it protects a frightened customer who receives a call on a Tuesday night. Anyone choosing a bank solely on fees and design would do well to look at its anti-fraud protocols too.
In the coming months, it will be necessary to wait for the Italian and Lithuanian investigations to learn whether Revolut strengthened its filters and whether anyone will answer for the improper handovers. Affected customers would do well to watch for impersonation attempts using their real documents and to enable alerts at all their banks. It is also advisable to distrust any interaction that cites their genuine statements. And N26 and Trade Republic users can apply the same simple rule of always calling the official number and never dictating codes. Trust in mobile banking is earned over years of good service and lost in a single afternoon of credulity, and September 2026 has already shown the price.