Quantum to break Bitcoin
ECDSA.Fail poses a provocative question to anyone who visits its page: Can you beat Google? The challenge consists of finding increasingly efficient quantum circuits to perform a point addition on secp256k1, the cryptographic curve used by Bitcoin and by traditional Ethereum accounts. It is not about breaking these networks, but about optimizing one of the operations that a future application of the Shor quantum algorithm against this type of cryptography would need.
The competition works as a public race. Participants modify the circuits, test new solutions and submit their results. ECDSA.Fail measures progress by multiplying the number of logical qubits used by the number of Toffoli gates, operations that are especially costly in fault-tolerant quantum computing. The lower the result of that product, the more efficient the circuit.
From Google to Kimi
Google serves as the benchmark because researchers from Google Quantum AI, alongside scientists from Stanford, UC Berkeley and the Ethereum Foundation, published in 2026 new estimates on the resources needed to apply Shor against secp256k1. One of their circuits classified for point addition uses 1,425 logical qubits and 2.1 million Toffoli gates, which in the metric used by ECDSA.Fail equals 2,992,500,000.
Bitcoin has until 2029 to adapt to the quantum era, according to Google
The result currently leading the challenge frontier uses 1,259 qubits and 903,434 Toffoli, with a score of 1,137,423,406. ECDSA.Fail sums up the difference by saying its circuit is 62% ahead of Google's classified circuit.
What is interesting is that the race is still alive. A day before the record achieved on September 9, 2026, another solution had been logged with 1,260 qubits and 902,838 Toffoli. Immediately after appear proposals associated with Claude Opus and DeepSeek. Further down the history there are also numerous optimizations made with GPT-5.
The page already counts 515 promoted results and 136 solvers, which makes it possible to understand ECDSA.Fail not as the isolated result of a group of scientists, but as a collective competition in which each optimization can serve as a starting point for the next.
ECDSA.Fail
The most novel part of the experiment is that the AI agents are not controlling quantum computers or attacking Bitcoin. They are helping to find more efficient ways to build the circuits that a quantum computer might need in the future.
The ultimate goal behind this race is Shor's algorithm. A sufficiently powerful fault-tolerant quantum computer could use it to solve the elliptic-curve discrete logarithm problem, the basis of secp256k1's security. Under certain conditions, that would make it possible to obtain a private key from its public key and generate valid signatures.
A machine capable of carrying out such an attack does not exist today. But ECDSA.Fail shows that the distance to it does not depend exclusively on hardware development. If the same calculation can be performed using fewer qubits and fewer operations, some of the requirements that a future machine will have to meet also decrease.
The competition is also finding different solutions depending on the resource to be saved. ECDSA.Fail currently logs a circuit that reduces usage to just 793 qubits, while another holds the minimum for operations with 902,838 Toffoli. They are not necessarily the solutions with the best overall product, but they show how far participants are exploring different ways of trading quantum memory for operations.
62% less does not mean Bitcoin is 62% easier to break
The 62% compares the efficiency of a specific operation with a Google benchmark circuit using the qubit-Toffoli metric. It does not mean that the full cost of breaking Bitcoin has fallen by 62%. A real attack would have to run the complete algorithm and deal with issues such as error correction, physical architecture, operation speed and many other costs that are not summarized in this scoreboard. In addition, researchers have warned of methodological differences between some of the circuits used in the comparisons.
Therefore, ECDSA.Fail does not prove that Bitcoin or Ethereum are threatened today by a quantum computer. What it does prove is that an important piece of the future attack can be optimized far more than previous estimates indicated.
The industry has spent years watching how many qubits Google, IBM, Microsoft, IonQ and the rest of the companies developing quantum computing manage to assemble. The expectation is that one day fault-tolerant machines will reach sufficient scale to turn Shor into a practical cryptographic threat.
In real time
ECDSA.Fail shows the other half of that race. While some companies try to build larger and more reliable quantum computers, researchers and AI agents are trying to make the problem those computers will have to solve smaller.
The scoreboard makes it possible to see this almost in real time. Google's benchmark is close to 3 billion on the qubit-Toffoli metric. The current result is around 1.137 billion. And the record changed again on September 9.
That continuous movement is probably more relevant for Bitcoin than this week's specific percentage. Estimates of how much quantum hardware would be needed can keep falling as humans and artificial agents find new shortcuts.
Bitcoin's quantum future, therefore, has two simultaneous races: building a sufficiently powerful machine and reducing the resources needed for that machine to attack its cryptography. ECDSA.Fail has just shown that the second is also moving fast.




