If banks want to compete with stablecoins, they will have to decide how much they are willing to pay their customers to keep their money in their savings accounts. According to a paper from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), increases in deposit remuneration are followed by slower growth in stablecoins. The relationship is stronger for USDC, issued by Circle, than for USDT, from Tether.
The study, authored by Rashad Ahmed and Iñaki Aldasoro, provides evidence that bank deposits and stablecoins are partial substitutes. Both allow funds to be kept available and payments to be made, albeit with differences in how they work, their risks and their legal protection. When banks offer higher interest rates, the appeal of leaving money in an account rather than holding it in a stablecoin increases.
The research uses weekly US data from January 2019 to June 2025. During that period, the market capitalization of reserve-backed stablecoins rose from less than USD 5 billion to more than USD 220 billion. The authors study how their growth responded to changes in bank interest rates.
The price of holding money
If a person keeps USD 1,000 in stablecoins in their wallet, they will normally still have that USD 1,000, without receiving interest. If they keep that money in an interest-bearing bank account, they can earn interest on it. The more the bank pays, the greater the incentive to choose the account.
The study notes that when banks raise their deposit rates, stablecoins keep growing, but at a slower pace. The researchers find that this relationship holds even when accounting for other factors that could influence it, such as Federal Reserve rates, US government debt yields or bitcoin's performance.
The researchers want to check whether the slower growth of stablecoins is related to what banks pay for deposits. That is why they take into account other alternatives that can also attract that money, such as Treasury bills when they offer higher yields.
The results suggest that banks can influence the growth of stablecoins, since the more they pay their customers to keep their money in their accounts, the less attractive it becomes to hold it in stablecoins.
The difference between USDC and USDT
When banks raise their deposit rates, USDC growth slows more than USDT growth. The authors link that difference to USDC's closer ties to US companies and institutional investors, for whom deposits in that country may be an alternative place to keep their money.
The report also indicates that the result is not solely due to the crises that hit the market during the period analyzed. The relationship holds when accounting for the collapse of FTX, the collapse of TerraUSD and the gradual withdrawal of BUSD. It also persists when excluding the period after the fall of Silicon Valley Bank, where Circle held part of USDC's reserves.
For other cryptocurrencies, they do not find that same relationship with bank interest rates. This reinforces the conclusion that deposits and stablecoins compete for part of users' money, because both allow funds to be kept available and payments to be made.
Banks also compete with stablecoins in DeFi
Keeping stablecoins in a wallet normally does not generate interest, but lending them through decentralized finance (DeFi) platforms can generate a return. In that case, the user is paid for making their funds available to other borrowers and assumes the risks of that loan and of the platform.
The researchers analyze whether banks also compete for that money. The results suggest they do: when bank accounts pay higher interest rates, the USDC and USDT balances supplied to these lending services also fall, even when accounting for the returns offered by the platforms.
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Therefore, offering yield in DeFi does not leave stablecoins outside bank competition. A better-remunerated account can be more attractive even for those who already use their stablecoins to earn income. The study does not show, however, that money withdrawn from those loans ends up directly in banks.
The result does not show that every withdrawal from a protocol ends up in a bank, nor does it allow the conclusion to be extended to all DeFi services. The authors present this analysis as a complementary check, based on a shorter period and with less precise estimates in some cases.
Competition for money
The study identifies a substitution relationship, but it does not track individual users' decisions. Therefore, it does not allow the claim that every dollar that stops flowing into stablecoins ends up deposited in a bank account.
Nor does it show that the growth of stablecoins necessarily reduces the system's total deposit volume or the loans that institutions grant. Competition for users' funds and its effects on bank funding as a whole are related but different questions.
The authors acknowledge the limitations of a still-young market, with insufficient information on where its holders are located and a small size relative to the US banking system. The data also end in June 2025.
If stablecoins reach broader use, this competition could influence banks' funding costs and how monetary policy decisions are transmitted. For now, the work shows that banks have a tool to compete with stablecoins: paying their customers more for their savings