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The hijacking of Across's domain exposes DeFi security

A social engineering attack on Across's domain registrar was used to set up a phishing site: about $350,000 drained across six networks.

The hijacking of Across's domain exposes DeFi security
The hijacking of Across's domain exposes DeFi security

The bridge was working and no one had touched it. At 18:45 UTC on November 10, 2026, anyone typing across.to into their browser did not find the Across app, but a site asking them to sign approvals to keep operating. The contracts were still deployed and audited; the domain that announced them already belonged to someone else.

A domain is the least glamorous asset in any protocol's inventory and the hardest to replace without consequences. Across had it registered with Namecheap, and that was the point the attackers chose: a social engineering operation against the registrar was enough to divert the traffic. One count of the incident puts the haul at about $350,000 spread across wallets on six networks, from Ethereum to Plasma.

The difference from a contract exploit is one of nature, not degree. Here there was no line of code to patch, but an account, a support process and a signature the user believed legitimate because the page carried the right logo under the right address. That explains why the incident was closed within hours and, at the same time, why it will be repeated on another protocol before the year is out.

The link that does not appear in the audit

The registrar is the company that sells the name and keeps the servers that tell the internet where a website lives. When that account falls, the attacker does not need to break anything else: they change the destination, keep the certificate and the brand, and put their own page in the same place where the user expected the legitimate one. Across attributed the incident to social engineering against Namecheap, the process of convincing a person that whoever is requesting the change is the domain owner.

That is the weak point in the chain. The name resolves to wherever an email account and a control panel say, not to wherever the code says, and the incident did not require any vulnerability.

Recovery came on November 11, with help from Namecheap founder Richard Kirkendall. Before that, the team had asked its users not to enter the app or sign approvals, and had confirmed that the domain had been in other hands since 18:45 UTC the previous day. The door that opened there deserves attention: a registrar's support desk can return a name to its owner in minutes or hand it to an impostor with a well-constructed call.

The scale of the target helps explain the choice. The bridge moved about $5.9 billion in 30 days and ranked third by transfer volume in the DefiLlama ranking, behind only Circle and LayerZero.

Fifteen minutes and one signature too many

Across received the alert in about fifteen minutes and launched its emergency protocol. The SEAL911 group, Security Alliance's 24-hour incident response, flagged the domain as phishing with the main wallet providers, and Cloudflare classified it as a risk and removed its DNS records. That combination is what really shuts off the tap: without name resolution, the fake site disappears for almost everyone.

The damage was done in that gap. The page asked users to sign approvals or permissions instead of the usual operation, and with that signature the attacker could move the tokens whenever they wanted. The EIP-2612 standard that popularized off-chain signed permissions explains why: the victim authorizes with their key and the attacker executes later, without gas and without a second confirmation that would raise suspicion.

Alongside this, the attack came in dribs and drabs: first $9,000 in USDC in one case, 7,053 USDT0 spread across seven transactions on Plasma in another, and an empty wallet after using the bridge several times.

Timeline of the assault and what remained intact

Time on November 10, UTC What happened Who acted
18:45 Takeover of the domain through social engineering Attackers, against the Namecheap account
Approximately 19:00 Internal alert and removal of the compromised site Across team
Subsequently Domain flagged as phishing with wallet providers SEAL911
No public time Domain classified as a risk and DNS records removed Cloudflare
November 11 Domain recovered and systems restored Across, with help from Namecheap

The table leaves a gap that no statement has filled: the exact time the DNS records were withdrawn. Without that data it is impossible to know how many minutes the fake website was resolving for the public, and that figure is precisely the one affected users would need to reconstruct whether their signature came from the legitimate page or from the copy.

The rest of the inventory was left out of scope. The bridge contracts were untouched, and Across maintained that third-party integrations and its API users continued to operate normally, so the attack lived entirely in the frontend. The ACX token barely moved in Wednesday's session, with a drop of less than 1% that suggests the market read the episode as an operational scare.

The figure Across does not sign off on

The $350,000 is a GoPlus estimate, not a figure from the protocol. Across has published neither the number of affected users nor the total drained; its public commitment is to compensate all affected users and publish a full report in the coming days. The promise is reasonable and is not yet verifiable.

That silence has a logic and a cost. Staying quiet avoids fixing a number that later grows and forces a correction, but it leaves affected users without a reference for claims and the analyst without a basis for measuring the damage. The DeFi loss tally the sector was working with in May spoke of $1 billion stolen in five months; DefiLlama's count already reaches $8.78 billion across 341 incidents in 2026.

Neither of those two figures describes well what happened at Across. The case looks more like corporate identity theft than an infrastructure breach, and that nuance is the one worth keeping.

Account governance, the outstanding task

The vector is not covered by audits, and that is the uncomfortable part for a sector that has spent years selling contract security. A domain is protected with transfer lock, with a physical second factor on the registrar account and with alerts for any change of name servers; these are administrative controls that do not appear in a technical report and that rarely have an owner with a name and surname.

The defense protocols deploy against permanent hacking covers contracts, bridges and keys; the registrar falls outside the manual because it is not code. And while the EU debates how to block fraudulent websites and freeze funds, the link that decides which web the user sees still hangs on an email account and on the person answering the phone at the registrar's support desk.

What a user can verify

After this case, the sensible routine for anyone using a bridge is boring and short. Before signing, it is worth checking that the website address is exactly the one the protocol publishes on its official account, not the one that arrives in a message or through a sponsored result, and to distrust any request for unlimited approval to a contract that is not recognized. Saving the official address in bookmarks avoids depending on a search engine that can place an ad ahead of the real result.

In the wallet, signature alerts and the list of active permissions exist and almost nobody reviews them. Revoking permissions that are no longer used reduces the loot of any future phishing.

The domain as part of the code

Across did what is expected of a team that has been hit: it cut, warned, recovered and promised to compensate. What it cannot change is the nature of the failure, because the bridge was never compromised and the user did not improvise either: they entered the correct address and signed what they were asked to sign. As long as the sector measures its security in contract audits, the next incident will look more like this one than like an exploit.

The promised report will say how much was lost and whether the compensation reached everyone. The question it will not answer is the one that matters to the rest of the protocols: who holds the keys to the domain, what second factor protects them and who receives the alert when someone changes the name servers on a Tuesday afternoon.

José Maldonado

Author

José Maldonado

Activist and blogger on technology, free software and blockchain.

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