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Windows Secure Boot certificates expire and security suffers

All four 2011 Secure Boot certificates have already expired. Machines without the 2023 CAs still boot, but they stop receiving boot patches.

Windows Secure Boot certificates expire and security suffers
Windows Secure Boot certificates expire and security suffers

The last of the four certificates with which Microsoft signed the boot process of virtually every Windows PC sold since 2012 has expired. The company published three days later that that expiry does not prevent powering on the machine or starting Windows, and there lies the part that gets misinterpreted: the system keeps working, but it stops receiving improvements in the first phase of boot, the one that decides which code can run before the operating system.

The affected certificates are Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011, Microsoft UEFI CA 2011 and Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011, replaced by the 2023 authorities that the company lists in its documentation. It affects Windows 10, Windows 11 and Windows Server, including the LTSC branches, and any system that shares firmware with Windows, Linux included. The 2025 Copilot+ PCs already shipped with the new keys and are out of scope.

What is lost is not booting, it is the margin: without the 2023 certificate in the firmware database, the machine accepts neither a new boot manager nor an updated revocation list. If a signed and compromised bootloader appears tomorrow, that machine will have no way to stop trusting it. The update requires touching firmware, KEK and DB, and the deadline for the first two passed in June.

What expired and what replaces it?

Microsoft set the schedule in June 2025, in a blog for administrators that asked for the manufacturer's firmware to be reviewed more than a year in advance. The four 2011 certificates are replaced by four from 2023 and they do not expire on the same day.

2011 certificate Expired 2023 replacement
Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011 June 24, 2026 Microsoft Corporation KEK 2K CA 2023
Microsoft UEFI CA 2011 June 27, 2026 Microsoft UEFI CA 2023 and Microsoft Option ROM UEFI CA 2023
Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011 October 19, 2026 Windows UEFI CA 2023

The split matters because a machine can have the 2023 certificate in the DB and still not accept revocations if its KEK is the old one. The KEK signs the database updates, the DB stores the accepted signatures and the DBX the revoked ones. Microsoft also separated the signing of third-party bootloaders from that of option ROM, so that a server does not have to trust any foreign bootloader just because it trusts a network card.

Without the certificate, it boots, but it is not secure

The expired certificate remains enrolled in the firmware's signature database, and as long as it stays there the machine keeps accepting what that certificate signed. The expiry date does not erase trust already granted: it limits the ability to sign new binaries with that key. That is why a PC that booted on October 18 still boots on the 20, with the same bootloader and the same signature.

The problem appears when something new is needed. A boot manager patch, a database update or an urgent revocation arrive signed with the 2023 authority.

That is where the door closes: Microsoft documents that those machines stop receiving new protections for the boot process, including updates to the boot manager, the Secure Boot databases and the revocation lists, as well as mitigations for vulnerabilities discovered in that phase. Scenarios that depend on that trust also suffer, such as hardened BitLocker or third-party bootloaders.

A close case

The case has a close relative in the TLS layer, where trust also rests on a handful of authorities and a misissued certificate forces revocation within hours, as happened with the eight eMudhra intermediates that signed with single-byte keys. The difference is that there the revocation traveled through the browser; here it depends on the firmware being able to receive it.

On October 22 Microsoft published a new notice: the last boot manager signed with the 2011 certificate is frozen across all supported Windows branches, with no further code patches or security fixes.

Future boot patches will be signed only with the 2023 authority, and upcoming major versions of Windows will require that certificate in the DB. The installation media will block installation on machines that do not have it.

Linux also changes keys, with the shim in between

The shim, the small binary that boots a Linux distribution's bootloader and that Microsoft signs so the firmware accepts it, came from the same 2011 authority. Since October 2025 Microsoft signs each shim with both keys, the old and the new, and since June 2026 it can only sign with the 2023 one. That transition leaves machines with the old DB facing an awkward choice.

Red Hat published shims signed with both keys for RHEL 9.8 and 10.2, and brought the dual-signed version to RHEL 8 in June 2026. Its guide for RHEL environments warns that a future shim, signed only with the 2023 key, will not boot if the firmware does not have that certificate in the DB, and that those unable to update it will have to keep using a vulnerable shim or disable secure boot.

The warning that most defies the intuition to clean thoroughly is the opposite one: the 2011 certificate must not be revoked. If it enters the DBX, the shim signed with both keys stops booting, because one of its signatures is no longer valid.

The same happens with option ROMs signed in 2011, which would stop running. Red Hat added a utility, sbchooser, inside the efivar package, to avoid installing a shim that the firmware cannot validate.

Each project keeps its own patch schedule, and it does not always match the firmware's: OpenBSD 8.0 arrived with support for Intel Arc and three security patches, while distributions with unmaintained firmware depend on a UEFI update that may not exist. For those machines, fwupd is the documented route to update the DB.

What needs to be done in a fleet that was not updated?

The order of the steps matters as much as the update. Microsoft insists on starting with the manufacturer's firmware and letting Windows Update distribute the certificates afterwards, because it is the firmware that stores the databases where the new keys are enrolled. For managed fleets there are inventory scripts and a gradual deployment guide, and the real work comes down to five checks.

  • Manufacturer firmware first, because without a UEFI that accepts the 2023 certificates the rest of the steps are useless.
  • DB status on each machine, with the Windows Security app on Windows and with fwupd on Linux.
  • A copy of the BitLocker recovery key before touching the boot chain, since a firmware update may ask for it.
  • WDAC policies and integration tools anchored in PCA 2011, capable of blocking properly signed updated binaries.
  • An inventory of virtual machines, because second-generation Hyper-V VMs receive the certificates through cumulative update, Azure VMs through the platform service and VMware VMs depend on the host and the hardware version.

None of those steps is exotic, and that is precisely the problem: they are inventory and maintenance tasks that compete with the rest of an administrator's work and that give no visible signals when postponed.

A debt that is only paid when revocation is needed

The 2011 expiry has not broken anything visible, and that is the uncomfortable part. A machine without the 2023 certificates boots, installs the monthly updates and shows no warning, while accumulating a debt that is only paid on the day a boot vulnerability appears and a compromised bootloader needs to be revoked. By then the window is already closed.

The lesson repeats at every layer of the trust chain, from TLS to firmware: certificates expire, algorithms are retired and migration always arrives late to the machines nobody inventoried. Microsoft published the schedule with more than a year of margin and the last deadline passed on October 19. Those who already updated will notice nothing; the rest will notice it all at once.

José Maldonado

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José Maldonado

Activist and blogger on technology, free software and blockchain.

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