During the trading day of November 19, more than 2,000 million dollars in USDS left Sky's Peg Stability Module, the token that replaced DAI. The module, known by its acronym PSM, exchanges USDC for USDS and DAI at a fixed one-to-one rate, and that day the available USDC fell from about 2,500 million to around 1,000, according to figures from the protocol's foundation. USDS circulation went from 5,240 to 3,160 million, 40% less in a single daily DefiLlama reading.
The trigger was not a code failure. On November 19, an investigation was published under the byline of the analysis firm Inca Digital that traced 518 million dollars moved through that same module by wallets linked to hacks, phishing and sanctioned entities over five years, of which 101.9 million were attributed to North Korean actors spread across 422 wallets. The module is the piece that allows fast entry and exit, so a headline about illicit money inside it translates into withdrawals within hours.
The protocol's response came on Friday the 20th and disputes the interpretation of the data, not its existence. Sky maintained that the PSM worked as designed and that total collateral, about 9,300 million, exceeded the sum of USDS and DAI in circulation at all times.
What is the PSM and why is it the gateway to USDS?
The Peg Stability Module is a seemingly simple mechanism. Anyone can bring USDC and receive USDS or DAI, or go the other way, with a fee and subject to available liquidity. That direct conversion is what keeps the price of USDS pegged to the dollar: if the token traded below, arbitrageurs would buy it cheap and redeem it for USDC at a dollar, and the pressure would return the price to its place.
The price of the design is that the module accumulates USDC, an asset issued by Circle that can be frozen by legal order. According to the original investigation, the module at one point held about 2,700 million USDC in a single Ethereum wallet, and there lies the risk analysts have pointed to for years: an order directed at Circle would block that balance and affect everyone who wants to redeem, not only those flagged.
The LitePSM documentation explains the detail that complicates the analysis. The software internally converts USDS into DAI when processing a redemption, so both tokens draw from the same USDC deposit, meaning a large movement of one shows up in the liquidity of the other and any withdrawal becomes a system-wide matter.
The discussion matters because it decides whether what happened was a stress test passed or a warning sign about the design of stablecoins that rest on an asset a third party can block by court order.
518 million in five years and a tiny percentage
The figure in the Inca Digital report is striking and, at the same time, the least informative part of the case. The publication itself places it in the context of a module that has processed more than 960,000 million dollars since its launch, which leaves those 518 million below 0.06% of total volume. The time breakdown is equally relevant: two thirds of the flagged activity occurred between 2021 and mid-2024, before the LitePSM existed.
The link to North Korea was built through fund traceability. Inca attributes 101.9 million to North Korean actors, including funds from the February 2025 Bybit theft, when about 1,500 million were stolen that the FBI attributed to the Asian country. The wallets funded with that money, passed 91.5 million through the module in the following ten days, and the firm Nominis reviewed more than 560 transactions and confirmed the links.
There the nuance appears that separates a report from an accusation. Traceability indicates where the money passed, not who moved it or with what intent, and an aggregator that chooses the best route can take an operation through the PSM without the user knowing, because 1inch, ParaSwap or MetaMask Swaps decide the path of each swap and the user only sees the final price.
That detail explains why the protocol responded with a technical review and not with a denial. If a third party chose the route, the module acted as infrastructure and not as an accomplice.
Block Analitica's rebuttal, point by point
Sky's foundation commissioned Block Analitica, its risk advisor, to review the cited transactions, and the result was published on November 20 in a statement with the technical detail. The firm does not deny the data: it disputes what they mean. And on several points the correction is relevant to anyone who uses the report as a reference.
| Point |
Inca Digital report |
Block Analitica review |
| Weight in the system |
518 million in five years |
Less than 0.06% of 960,000 million processed |
| Age |
Activity spread through 2024 |
Two thirds before the LitePSM, between 2021 and mid-2024 |
| North Korean link |
101.9 million in 422 wallets |
Many wallets are two or more transfers away from a listed address |
| The 91.5 million from Bybit |
Left through the module |
Only about 560,000 were redemption of own USDC; the rest, routed ETH sales |
| Who chose the route |
The module user |
Aggregators such as 1inch, ParaSwap and MetaMask Swaps |
The most uncomfortable point for the original report is the fourth. If most of those 91.5 million corresponds to ether sales that an aggregator routed in part through the PSM, then the module was not a chosen channel to move freezable money, but an intermediate stop in an operation seeking the best price available on the market.
What does still stand
With the rebuttal on the table, the structural risk does not disappear. The PSM still concentrates USDC in one wallet, Circle retains the power to freeze addresses and a court order on that balance would affect everyone who wants to redeem, including those who have nothing to do with the report.
There is a side effect worth noting. After the accusations became known, Ethena detailed its screening rules for USDe, with approved counterparties as the only way to issue or redeem directly. It is the usual pattern: every compliance scandal pushes issuers toward whitelists, and whitelists reduce the usefulness of a token as money.
There is also a lesson about how to communicate. Sky responded with data in less than twenty-four hours and with an independent third party, and even so the 2,000 million outflow had already occurred, because in a system where redemption is instant and verification takes a day the sequence weighs more than the final reason.
The money that Circle and Tether froze by police order shows the other end of the same problem. The FBI tracing of the Binance funds reminds us that traceability works in both directions: it also serves to point to a protocol that only provided a conversion service to whoever asked for it.
That double edge is the reason issuers are moving toward whitelists and approved counterparties, a move that reduces legal risk and shrinks the market at the same time.
What this week leaves in stablecoin design
The question that survives the clash of reports is not whether Sky laundered money, because no authority has opened a case and the report's own numbers point to the contrary. The question is how much a liquidity module can grow that rests on an asset freezable by design, and whether the market will accept that risk when volume is measured in hundreds of thousands of millions.
The answer the market gave on November 19 was sell first and read later. The one the protocol gave on the 20th was publish and discuss. Between the two there is a trust gap that a statement does not close, and that gap is what bears watching in the next episode, because next time the report will not have to be correct to move 2,000 million: it will be enough for it to arrive on a Friday.