The European Central Bank wants a single authority to decide who can operate with cryptoassets in the European Union. Its November Financial Stability Report, a 141-page document published on November 18, backs ESMA, the European Securities and Markets Authority, taking on authorization, monitoring and sanctioning powers over all cryptoasset service providers, the CASPs currently overseen by national authorities.
The text is not a law or a regulation. It is the central bank's half-yearly risk review, and the Governing Council endorsed it on November 12, six days before publication. It arrives, however, at a delicate point in the legislative process: the Council of the EU already set out a more restrictive position on October 9, reserving direct European supervision for providers deemed significant, and the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs is scheduled to vote on December 1. The date of the Council agreement appears in two versions, and one places it on October 2. The ECB is pushing in the opposite direction to the co-legislators.
There is a second front in the same report, and it affects stablecoins. The central bank proposes replacing the obligation to hold a fixed percentage of reserves in bank deposits with liquidity floors on reserve assets. Neither idea changes today a license, a supervisor or an obligation for entities already operating in Spain under CNMV supervision, but both set the ground for the MiCA reform being negotiated this winter.
The sentence that underpins the chapter is explicit: the ECB supports the European Commission's proposal to transfer to ESMA the authorization, monitoring and enforcement powers for all CASPs. The official text adds that the category of significant providers should be kept within MiCA, with stricter prudential requirements, and that the criteria should be expanded with objective metrics.
The document stays at the principle and avoids the arithmetic, which is the part that decides who enters and who stays out of the common regime. That is also its weakness: a principle without a threshold can be cited in any direction.
Those metrics are size, cross-border activity, systemic relevance, trading volume on platforms, volume exchanged by funds and activity across the group as a whole. The report sets no numerical thresholds, names no entities and establishes no transfer timetable, a caution worth keeping because the political discussion will soon fill with figures the document does not contain.
Nor does it refer to all financial intermediaries. The "all" has a limit: credit institutions providing services with cryptoassets would remain within the banking supervision framework and would not automatically move to ESMA, a nuance that considerably narrows the real scope of the headline.
From supervising everyone to supervising the big players
The original proposal is in the market integration and supervision package the Commission presented on December 4, 2025. Its central idea is to end the current system, in which a member state authorizes a provider and that permit allows it to operate in the other twenty-six, and to concentrate authorization, day-to-day monitoring and sanctions for the whole market in Paris.
The Council trimmed that scope. Its October position holds that ESMA should directly supervise significant providers and leave the rest in the hands of national authorities, with technical standards, peer reviews and emergency intervention powers reserved for the European authority.
The Parliament's draft, with MEPs Markus Ferber and Eero Heinäluoma as rapporteurs, follows the same line by limiting direct supervision to significant providers through a new Article 59a of MiCA, although it reserves market abuse enforcement for ESMA across all firms, large and small.
The point of friction is the definition. MiCA considers a provider significant when it has 15 million annual active users in the EU, a threshold the European system of central banks describes as undemanding because those who exceed it receive no specific additional obligations. The ECB prefers several combined indicators rather than a single user figure.
| Who |
What they advocate |
Status |
| European Commission |
ESMA authorizes, monitors and sanctions all CASPs |
December 2025 proposal |
| Council of the EU |
ESMA supervises only significant providers |
October 9 position |
| Parliament (ECON) |
Direct supervision of significant providers and market abuse for all |
Vote scheduled for December 1 |
| ECB |
ESMA supervises all and keeps the category of significant providers |
November 18 report |
Stablecoin reserves, from deposits to liquidity
The second change is more technical and has faster effects on issuers. MiCA currently requires that 30% of the reserves of a non-significant stablecoin and 60% of those of a significant one be held in bank deposits. The ECB report considers that this minimum could be eliminated and replaced by liquidity requirements on reserve assets, on condition that they remain sufficient to meet redemptions quickly.
The document itself warns that these liquidity floors must be calibrated carefully because of their second-order effects, and it includes no percentages. The technical proposal the European system of central banks sent to the Commission in September speaks of 20% at one day and 30% at five days for non-significant ones, and 40% and 60% for significant ones, according to the breakdown of the pulse on the stablecoin license.
The underlying argument is two risks. The first is contagion between banks and issuers, the same mechanism seen in March 2023, when the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank left part of USDC's reserves in limbo and triggered a run. The second is profitability: with corporate deposits paying 0.53% in April 2026, a mandatory buffer at the bank makes euro stablecoins less attractive.
The change has losers. A liquidity floor forces you to hold assets available daily and that costs money; a bank deposit forces you to negotiate with an institution, and that also costs, but in a different way and with a different balance sheet behind it.
The ECB also maintains the ban on paying interest on stablecoins and wants to extend it to the indirect channels currently left out, such as cryptoasset lending between individuals, staking and liquidity mining incentives. The report adds that one in twenty consumers in the eurozone holds stablecoins, almost all denominated in dollars.
What changes for those operating from Spain
Today, nothing. The authorization and monitoring of providers established in Spain remain in the hands of the CNMV, and the report does not alter licenses or national supervisory functions. The document does not anticipate what tasks the Spanish regulator would keep for the rest of its mandate.
If the co-legislators adopted the proposal on the terms the ECB backs, a provider authorized in Madrid would have a single interlocutor in Paris for authorization and sanctions, and national authorities would be left with an enforcement and coordination role. The Council speaks of a two-year transition to move those powers, a deadline no approved text yet contains.
The digital euro the ECB is preparing shares that logic of European concentration. At the other extreme, the stablecoins that Circle and Tether froze on police orders show what it means for a supervisor to have the final say over a private ledger.
A single supervisor gains coherence and loses closeness, and that trade-off is precisely what states discuss at every Council meeting. For a small asset manager, calling Madrid is not the same as competing for the attention of a European authority.