# CVE-2026-83844 in Paint: the patch only arrives via the Microsoft Store

> The fix for the code execution flaw in Paint does not travel through Windows Update. Version 11.2609.401.0 must be forced on each account on the device.
> By José Maldonado · Technology · 2026-11-10

The code execution flaw in Paint has a patch, and the patch does not arrive through the channel most people check. CVE-2026-83844 is an out-of-bounds read in the application that Microsoft classifies as important, and the corrected version, 11.2609.401.0, is distributed only through the Microsoft Store. Neither Windows Update nor the monthly patch cycle delivers it.

The timeline explains the confusion. Microsoft published the advisory on October 13, and for weeks the build number listed as fixed was not available in the store. The [tracking by Brian Vitko](https://getrff.com/blog/windows-store-app-cves-every-copy/) documents those days: on November 4 the correct build already appeared in the advisory, but the Store still offered an earlier one.

The build with the fix reached the store on November 6 and was available in ten countries. The problem is what happened in the meantime, because a device that has not updated the application remains exposed even if its Windows is up to date. And there is no way to know from the monthly bulletin, which does not mention Paint on any line. The detail that breaks audits is another one: the [CVE record](https://www.darkreading.com/application-security/microsoft-rce-bug-windows-paint-confusion) still says Paint is affected only below 11.2605.91.0, while the vendor's advisory already names 11.2609.401.0 as the fixed version.

## A CVE with two reference versions

That mismatch has direct consequences. A scanner that reads the CVE record, or its entry in the NVD, will mark any device with 11.2605.91.0 or higher as fixed. A device on 11.2609.0 would pass the audit and remain vulnerable, because the version that actually closes the flaw is the next one.

The advisory also includes no workaround or mitigation. Microsoft's recommendation is to go through the store and check the version in the application itself, under Settings and About, or from PowerShell with \`Get-AppxPackage -Name Microsoft.Paint\`. Anything below 11.2609.401.0 counts as pending.

The severity has figures that shift. Microsoft publishes it as important, and the sources consulted give scores of 7.0 and 8.1 depending on the CVSS version used. Exploitation requires local access and some user interaction, which explains why this is not a ten.

## The problem of multiple copies

Store applications are installed per user account. A PC with three accounts can have three copies of Paint, each updated when that account last opened the store, plus a provisioned copy that Windows uses for new profiles. Updating the open session does not touch the others.

On Vitko's test machines, four versions of Paint appeared across eight devices, and one laptop had two installed at the same time. A device that had not checked anything since September was still on 11.2412.295.0, alongside old versions of codec extensions.

For an administrator, the full check involves \`Get-AppxPackage -AllUsers -Name Microsoft.Paint\` and \`Get-AppxProvisionedPackage -Online\`, which returns the copy that will be installed for new profiles. It is advisable to ignore the \`NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM\` rows: the store scan registers some applications for the system itself.

The mass update can be launched from Intune or another management tool by calling the \`UpdateScanMethod\` method of \`MDM\_EnterpriseModernAppManagement\_AppManagement01\`, with a warning that Vitko himself tested: with the Store disabled by policy, the call returns success and updates nothing.

## A problem beyond Paint

The lesson is not about an image editor. It is about a distribution model in which every application has its own channel, its own schedule and its own minimum version, while the operating system is still audited as a single block. The case belongs to the same family as the [Windows 11 26H2 flaws](https://observatorioblockchain.com/en/technology/windows-11-26h2-fallos-una-semana/) and the [Secure Boot certificate expiry](https://observatorioblockchain.com/en/cybersecurity/certificados-secure-boot-windiws-caducan-2026/): pieces that update outside the monthly bulletin.

Teams that manage patches by monthly bulletin have a structural blind spot with everything that arrives through the Store: HEVC codecs, image extensions, Terminal, Notepad and now Paint. Each one has its own CVE and its minimum build, and none of them appears in the Windows update report.

The real inventory of a Windows estate now includes two different catalogs. The first is that of the operating system, with its monthly bulletins and its build numbers. The second is that of the applications that update themselves, which nobody audits because they are assumed to be up to date, and which on a machine with three accounts can coexist in four different versions while the user believes everything is updated.

That blind spot grows over time. An application that updated itself for months can become frozen because the user disabled automatic updates, because the machine was turned off or because the domain policy points to an internal store that no longer receives packages.

## What you should do

The priority is to verify, not trust. List every copy of Paint on managed devices, compare it with 11.2609.401.0 and update any that are below it, including the provisioned copy in the system image used for deployment.

Where Paint is not used, the option to remove it for all users and from the provisioned image reduces the attack surface, although it is worth testing first on a small group: it is not an operation Microsoft documents for this case.

The last step is about inventory. If the organization has a catalog of Store applications with their versions, this incident is the reason to populate it; if it does not, any future audit of this kind will start from scratch again and depend on someone opening the application and checking the number by hand.

## Microsoft still has work to do

Microsoft has yet to align the CVE record with its advisory, and the NVD has yet to complete its analysis, which was still marked as in progress on the publication date. As long as the two records do not match, any automated compliance report will say the estate is clean before it is.

It also remains to be seen whether the Store fixes the update behavior when the store is disabled by policy, which is the most awkward case: the tool says it did its job and the device stays the same. Anyone managing large estates should verify the version after each sweep and not trust the return code.
