# FaceStealer, the North Korean deepfake and crypto scam network

> DOJ dismantles FaceStealer infrastructure, with $400 million stolen in 18 months and 900 webcam videos seized from the North Korean network.
> By José Maldonado · Cybersecurity · 2026-11-13

An invitation to a video call from a colleague's account opens the door. There is no one on the other side: there is a recorded video of that colleague, played live to simulate that they are present. That is the mechanism of FaceStealer, the campaign the U.S. Department of Justice disrupted on November 12, 2026, and which has stolen more than $400 million in 18 months, according to the [department's official statement](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-actions-disrupt-north-koreas-massive-theft-cryptocurrency).

The operation had two separate fronts. One, the seizure of the cloud infrastructure that sustained the campaign, announced by the federal prosecutor's office for the Central District of California together with the FBI. The other, judicial authorization to seize or retain more than $1.2 billion stolen from Binance on October 29, 2026, within a total of more than $2.7 billion frozen between authorities and private companies.

The Binance haul already has its own story and is not this week's news. What is new is the method: the FBI seized more than 900 webcam videos of victims of the campaign, material the network later reused to impersonate those people before their contacts. And the targets are no longer only investors with a wallet: increasingly they are open source software developers, the shortest path to a supply chain attack.

## A scheme with seven names on the list

The Department of Justice lists seven public aliases for the same team: Sapphire Sleet and UNC1069; Dangerous Password and CryptoCore; APT38, BlueNoroff and Stardust Chollima. So many labels do not indicate seven different gangs, but seven vendor baptisms that detected the same activity from different angles.

The [FBI fact sheet on the scheme](https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber/facestealer-cryptocurrency-theft-scheme) cuts the list to five of those names and adds a detail the statement does not highlight: the attackers also set up fake copies of popular videoconferencing platforms. The vector, then, is not only the stolen account, but the program the victim believes they are using while sharing their screen.

Figure

What it measures

Source

$400 million

Stolen with FaceStealer in 18 months

DOJ and FBI

900 videos

Webcam recordings seized by the FBI

DOJ

$1.2 billion

Seized or retained by court order from the Binance theft

DOJ

$2.7 billion

Frozen between authorities and the private sector

DOJ

$6 billion

Stolen from Binance on October 29, 2026

DOJ

The first rows describe the social engineering campaign and the police response; the last explains why the operation was confused with the Binance case.

## The call in which you are not the one speaking

The fraud script begins with an account compromised days or months earlier. From it comes the invitation to the target, who recognizes the name and accepts. Inside the meeting, the attackers play a recorded video of a previous victim known to the target and record their webcam, so that in the next round the face that appears on screen is theirs.

Two resources speed up the deception. The first is AI-generated videos of influential figures in the sector, the technique the DOJ calls superintelligence and which serves to lend credibility to the meeting. The second is a faked malfunction: the attackers say the target cannot be heard and send them a link to fix it.

That link is the malware. With the device compromised, the network can empty wallets or use the victim's access to other accounts, and in several cases it did so between several months and more than a year after the first contact, when the call had already been forgotten.

## Why does the video call beat email?

A phishing email is judged in two seconds by the sender's address and the spelling. A video call is judged by the face and voice of someone you already trust, and those two indicators are exactly the ones the campaign fakes. The deepfake does not need to be perfect because the conversation is neither recorded nor reviewed.

The technical part of FaceStealer is the cheapest part of the attack. Recording a victim's webcam, saving the video and playing it in the next meeting requires storage and some coordination, not a zero-day exploit. The real expense is in getting accounts of people with a reputation, and that part is solved with patience.

### From the wallet to the repository

The classic target is people with cryptoassets on their phone or in their browser extension. The 2026 shift is different in nature: the FBI documents that attackers are targeting those who develop and maintain open source software, in order to get into their machines and the accounts that control their repositories.

The logic of the leap is simple and not very reassuring. A maintainer with write permission on a popular library unknowingly provides a route to distribute malicious code across thousands of projects that trust that dependency. The [review of the Binance haul](https://observatorioblockchain.com/en/cybersecurity/fbi-robo-binance-corea-del-norte/) already showed the group's ability to wait for months inside a compromised network.

For the crypto ecosystem the problem is twofold, because much of its wallets, nodes and libraries depend on packages maintained by volunteers. A stolen repository account is worth more than a wallet with a balance: the wallet is emptied once, the account is used every time someone updates.

## The 1.2 billion is context, not the news

The second action on November 12 is the seizure and retention of assets from the Binance theft, put at more than 6 billion dollars and attributed to TraderTraitor, the arm of the same state apparatus. The joint freeze exceeds 2.7 billion and the judicial operation covers more than 1.2 billion of that total.

Both measures were presented as coordinated actions against the regime's financing, not as two separate cases, and the account of the operation against FaceStealer and Binance includes them in the same November 12 announcement.

The money does not stay still. The department describes money laundering in progress using bridges, mixers and exchanges. Last week, the FBI and the Secret Service, together with the tax investigation unit, issued a notice for virtual asset service providers to block the addresses linked to the haul.

The [timeline of the 6.3 billion theft](https://observatorioblockchain.com/en/cybersecurity/binance-robo-6300-millones-trm-lazarus/) helps to place the figures the prosecutor's office is now handling and the size of what lies ahead. Without the cooperation of exchanges, a court order on specific addresses is little more than a gesture.

The network's business has two mutually reinforcing legs. One is the theft of individual wallets through social engineering, with medium-sized amounts and thousands of victims. The other is the assault on large platforms, which finances the apparatus and needs months of money laundering before touching the financial system.

## Trust cannot be patched

The FBI's advice is reasonable and comes late: distrust meetings no one convened, verify through a second channel and do not install anything that arrives by link while a call is going on. That habit protects a private investor and does not scale to a maintainer who receives ten requests a day from people he knows by sight.

What changes with the operation is the cost for the network. Losing the infrastructure and seeing 900 videos published forces logistics to be rebuilt and stolen accounts to be burned, even if the [money-laundering machinery with memecoins and bridges](https://observatorioblockchain.com/en/cybersecurity/memecoins-usar-tirar-blanquear-botin-binance/) keeps running with the same patience. The cheap part of the fraud is filming someone; the expensive part is setting up the next cover.

The seizure does not close the case, and therein lies the discomfort for anyone who maintains an open library. If a real contact invites you to a video call with their face and their voice, the question is no longer whether the video is authentic, but what you check through another channel before installing what they ask you to.
