# Warning: hackers industrialize theft in Ethereum wallets

> Falling fees on Ethereum enable massive poisoning attacks that have led to million-dollar thefts from wallets
> By José Maldonado · Cybersecurity · 2026-02-18

The Fusaka upgrade has drastically reduced fees on Ethereum and boosted its scalability, but it has also enabled a new wave of address poisoning attacks. With mass sending of fake transactions now cheaper than ever, hackers have industrialized "poisoning", causing million-dollar losses among users who trust their wallets' recent history.

The Ethereum network has reached a turning point with the implementation of the Fusaka upgrade, activated on December 3, 2025. While this milestone represents significant progress toward massive scalability and lower operating costs for the average user, it has brought an unforeseen consequence in the security arena: the democratization of the poisoning attack, or address poisoning.

And in recent months, [**a recent security report**](https://www.talos.com/insights/state-of-the-network-349) from Talos has revealed million-dollar losses due to a sophisticated exploitation of the user interface architecture and the psychology of digital asset holders.

This phenomenon is not due to a flaw in Ethereum's protocol code, but rather to manipulation of transaction history enabled by the drastic drop in gas fees. By lowering the economic barriers to mass transaction sending, malicious actors have industrialized the process of "poisoning" wallets, flooding applications with addresses visually similar to legitimate ones in the hope that a copy-and-paste error results in the total draining of funds.

**[THE HACKERS' TRICK TO EMPTY YOUR WEB3 WALLET WITH SIMULATED TRANSACTIONS](https://observatorioblockchain.com/blockchain/hackers-transacciones-simuladas-robar-tu-monedero-web3/)**

## The Fusaka upgrade and the collapse in fees

To understand why the poisoning attack has resurfaced with such virulence, it is imperative to analyze the structural changes introduced by the Fusaka upgrade. This upgrade was designed to optimize data availability and improve the efficiency of execution layers.

## The mechanics of PeerDAS and blob capacity

The central component of Fusaka is EIP-7594, known as [**Peer-to-Peer Data Availability Sampling or PeerDAS**](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7594). This innovation allows network nodes to verify that a transaction's data (blobs) is available without needing to download the entire dataset.

By using a one-dimensional erasure coding extension based on Reed-Solomon codes, the data is divided into cells, rows and columns, allowing a node to have high statistical confidence in the block's integrity by sampling only a fraction of the data.

The increase in the gas limit to 60 million, combined with the efficiency of PeerDAS, has caused the cost of sending a digital asset on Ethereum's mainnet to fall to levels comparable with Layer 2 networks prior to 2025. According to market analysis, transaction fees have decreased by approximately 96.5% since early 2024, reaching averages of just $0.20 per operation, and even less for simple token transfers.

## The erosion of the "spam tax"

Historically, Ethereum maintained a natural economic barrier against spam due to its high gas fees. Sending millions of "junk" or "dust" transactions was financially unviable for an attacker.

However, in the post-Fusaka environment, the cost of sending 10 million poisoning transactions has been greatly reduced. This disappearance of the "spam tax" has allowed industrial poisoning campaigns to flood the history of millions of users simultaneously.

Basically, the Fusaka improvements have driven the rise of poisoning attacks, making it economical to launch such attacks, and with the increased use of the network, the critical mass has been generated for these attacks to cause major havoc.

**[HOW THE FC BARCELONA HACKER MADE $26,000 IN HOURS WITH PUMP.FUN](https://observatorioblockchain.com/ciberseguridad/como-el-hacker-del-fc-barcelona-gano-26-000-en-horas-con-pump-fun/)**

## Anatomy of a poisoning attack

The poisoning attack is essentially a social engineering tactic that relies on a minor technical vulnerability: **the way digital wallet interfaces truncate Ethereum addresses.**

Recall that an Ethereum address is a 42-character hexadecimal string (for example, 0x77f6ca8E…b62bfc65). Since it is nearly impossible for a human being to memorize such strings, most users only verify the first four and last four characters before confirming a transfer. And there lies the flaw, as attackers exploit this habit using vanity address generation tools such as Profanity2 or Profanity3.

These tools use the processing power of graphics processing units (GPUs) to generate addresses that have exactly the same prefix and suffix as the address to which the victim usually sends their digital assets.

Once the attacker identifies a high-value target (such as a whale or an institutional wallet), they analyze its public history on the block explorer to identify its frequent destination addresses, such as those of centralized exchanges or over-the-counter (OTC) desks. They then generate a visually "twin" address and send a small amount of a digital asset (often a zero-value token that mimics a legitimate one) to the victim. This transaction "poisons" the victim's recent wallet history, positioning the attacker's address where the user would normally copy their trusted address.

## Automation and mass distribution contracts

The current scale of these attacks is achieved through specialized smart contracts that automate the distribution of poisoning "dust". Researcher Andrey Sergeenkov [**identified**](https://sergeenkov.com/record-high-activity-ethereum-2026/) contracts such as [**0x455bf23ea7575a537b6374953fa71b5f3653272c**](https://etherscan.io/address/0x455bf23ea7575a537b6374953fa71b5f3653272c), which have been responsible for sending millions of bait transfers to hundreds of thousands of unique addresses.

These contracts use functions such as fundPoisoners to fund multiple attack wallets in a single transaction, sending both the bait digital asset and small fractions of Ether to cover the gas for the poisoners' future transactions. This hierarchical structure allows the attack to scale rapidly, flooding the network and Ethereum's usage metrics with non-organic activity.

## Impact on users

The effectiveness of the poisoning attack has been demonstrated by a series of high-profile incidents between December 2025 and February 2026. Despite constant security education, the sophistication of visual mimicry continues to claim victims.

In February 2026 alone, a user lost $600,000 after copying a poisoned address from their transaction history. Barely a week earlier, another investor lost $350,000 under even more troubling circumstances: t**he user had made an initial test transaction, but "the test fund was not properly confirmed before sending the main amount."**

**[SEVERAL DEFI PROTOCOLS ARE BEING VICTIMS OF A DNS HACK](https://observatorioblockchain.com/ciberseguridad/varios-protocolos-defi-estan-siendo-victimas-de-un-hackeo-dns/)**

This incident underscores an advanced tactic, namely that attackers often monitor the network in real time and, as soon as they detect a legitimate test transaction, immediately send a poisoning transaction from a similar address so that the last entry in the victim's history is the attacker's and not the real recipient's. If the user copies the last address that appears in their wallet without verifying every character, they could end up losing everything.

## The record $12.4 million theft

And this once again works. For example, on January 30, 2026, one of the largest individual losses to date was reported: a**digital asset holder lost 4,556 ETH (approximately $12.4 million) in what appeared to be a routine transfer to an OTC deposit**.

In this case, the attacker had been systematically "poisoning" the victim's wallet for more than two months, persistently sending low-value transfers since Fusaka was activated. This persistence increased the chances that, in a moment of haste or inattention, the user would copy the wrong address.

With this, hackers make genuine fortunes, and all they have to do is listen to the network, have addresses ready for poisoning, and wait for the user to fall into the trap. Thus, the motto "don't trust, verify" must evolve into "verify everything, not just the ends" to survive in the new era of low-cost transactions.
