# How Bitcoin and Ethereum are preparing for the quantum threat

> Bitcoin and Ethereum prepare for quantum computing with post-quantum cryptography to protect keys and funds
> By José Maldonado · Cybersecurity · 2026-01-27

The security of cryptocurrencies has historically relied on the robustness of public-key cryptography, a system that allows transactions to be made securely without revealing the user's identity. However, the accelerated advance of quantum computing has turned a theoretical concern into a national and financial security priority. In fact, companies such as IBM and Google have achieved milestones in qubit stability that are forcing the developers of the world's largest networks, Bitcoin and Ethereum, to accelerate their plans to shield them against what many call the "cryptographic apocalypse."

**[CYBERSECURITY TRENDS 2026: POST-QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY UNDERWAY](https://observatorioblockchain.com/ciberseguridad/tendencias-de-ciberseguridad-2026/)**

## The defense plan against quantum computing

But **What steps are developers taking to protect blockchain networks?** In the Ethereum ecosystem, the transition to quantum resistance has become a central piece of the new roadmap set out by Vitalik Buterin.

Here, the main strategy relies on **Account Abstraction**, a technical upgrade that allows users to change the type of algorithm that protects their wallets. Instead of being limited to traditional signatures, users will be able to migrate their funds to smart contracts that use signature schemes based on STARKs, which are computationally impossible to crack even for an advanced quantum computer.

In addition, the Ethereum Foundation has designed contingency plans to execute recovery forks (basically undoing operations to recover balances, as was done in the attack on The DAO) in case a quantum attack occurs before most users have upgraded their accounts.

## Bitcoin's vision

For its part, the Bitcoin community has adopted a more conservative approach but one that is equally rigorous and perhaps much safer. The technical discussion centers on proposals such as BIP 360, an improvement that seeks to implement the concept of [**Pay-To-Tapscript-Hash (P2TSH)**](https://bip360.org/bip360.html). This system hides the user's public key behind a double hash until the exact moment the funds are moved.

In this way, by reducing the exposure of the public key, the window of opportunity for a quantum attacker to calculate the private key is minimized. With this, Bitcoin Core developers are also evaluating the integration of Lamport and Winternitz signatures, hash-based signature methods that have already proven resistant to known quantum attacks, and that could be integrated very quickly into Bitcoin's current operating scheme, without breaking the software's backward compatibility, something essential within Bitcoin.

## Why is quantum computing a real threat?

And all this work begins with something very simple: **the vulnerability of current blockchain networks lies in Shor's algorithm**. This algorithm is a mathematical tool designed specifically so that quantum computers can factor large integers in a very short period of time.

For example, while a conventional computer (like the one you have at home) would take billions of years to reverse a Bitcoin public key to find its private key (and take the bitcoins it stores), a quantum computer could do it in a few months, weeks, days or hours, if it has the necessary power.

This would compromise elliptic curve cryptography (ECDSA), which is the standard that currently protects the ownership of almost all digital assets on the market. Of course, this would not only affect Bitcoin or Ethereum; in reality, every blockchain, encrypted communication (such as WhatsApp) and even banks would be threatened by this. They would have no escape.

## The architecture of old addresses

Hence the urgency of changing this landscape, because the danger lies in the very architecture of old addresses. Millions of Bitcoins, including those mined in the early days by Satoshi Nakamoto, reside in addresses whose public keys are already exposed on the blockchain.

Without a proactive migration toward post-quantum standards, these funds become static targets for any actor that manages to develop a quantum computer with error correction. The integrity of the network depends not only on the ability to process new transactions, but also on protecting the immense store of value accumulated over almost two decades.

**[GOOGLE'S QUANTUM ADVANCE REVIVES THE DEBATE ON BITCOIN SECURITY](https://observatorioblockchain.com/ciberseguridad/el-avance-cuantico-de-google-reaviva-el-debate-sobre-seguridad-de-bitcoin/)**

## Debunking common myths about the quantum threat

But despite the seriousness of the challenge, there is a great deal of misinformation that generates unnecessary panic. The first myth is that Bitcoin will die overnight; in reality, upgrading the network is a consensus process that allows new security rules to be implemented gradually.

Furthermore, quantum computers are not something publicly usable at this time. It is not as if you can go to the corner tech store and buy one to use it to hack Bitcoin, and if you did, it would be so expensive that the capital you already have in your possession would be enough to live a quiet life. Of course, here the clearest actor and threat are nation-states, because they will be the first to have the ability to use that technology, and for now very few have that capability.

## In IBM's hands

The second common mistake is believing that quantum computers can guess any password. The truth is that they are only effective against specific signature algorithms such as ECDSA (Bitcoin and derivatives) or EdDSA (Ethereum and derivatives), while hash functions such as SHA-256, which is used in mining, remain secure simply by increasing the key size.

And here is a point worth highlighting: a Bitcoin address, such as those beginning with 1, 3 or b, is hashed with SHA-256, so it is quantum-resistant, as long as you do not reuse it for payments. Once you use it, the ECDSA public key is exposed and you are in danger; otherwise you can be sure they will not be able to do anything against it.

A third myth holds that machines capable of breaking Bitcoin's encryption already exist today, or that they will in a couple of years. Although the advances are notable, current systems still lack the millions of physical qubits needed to run Shor's algorithm at a useful scale, not to mention the execution time. The team with the most qubits is currently in IBM's hands and is known as [**Condor**](https://www.ibm.com/quantum/blog/quantum-roadmap-2033).

## Condor

It has 1000 qubits, far from the at least 13 million qubits needed to attack Bitcoin. But it is not only that it is far from the number of qubits; Condor cannot operate stably for more than 10 minutes.

That means that once the quantum computer using Condor is turned on, it can only operate stably and without significant errors for at least 10 minutes; after that the system becomes a chaos of errors and its computation is unreliable, forcing the calculation cycle to restart. And this is important, because with 13 million qubits, attacking a single Bitcoin address would take about 24 hours, so we have a wide safety margin.

## Danger beyond crypto

Fourth, it is often thought that only cryptocurrencies are at risk, ignoring that global banking infrastructure and government secrets depend on the same vulnerable cryptography. Basically, everything that uses public-key cryptography is in the crosshairs, so in reality our entire current digital world is at risk.

Finally, many believe that lost coins will be stolen instantly, when most likely the community will decide to block or "burn" unclaimed vulnerable addresses to prevent an attacker from devaluing the total supply. In fact, this may be a possibility in cases such as Satoshi Nakamoto's balances.

That million BTC is spread across thousands of addresses, some of the P2PK type (with exposed public keys) and others of the P2PKH type (which are hashed with SHA-256 and therefore protected against quantum attacks). Either way, there is a possibility of protection and time to think about the mechanism to do it in the best way.
